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THE STATUS OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS-
BEFORE AND AFTER ERIE
CURTIS A. BRADLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The greatest weakness of international human rights law may be
the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism. There is, to date, no
general international criminal court. The jurisdiction of existing inter-
national tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice, often re-
quires state consent, and the formal sanctions for noncompliance with
the tribunals' decisions are often weak or nonexistent. Needless to say,
the domestic courts of the alleged violator of human rights cannot al-
ways be counted on to provide an effective forum for enforcement. Al-
though there are less formal methods of enforcement, such as monitor-
ing by international organizations and self-reporting, these methods are
not generally regarded as sufficient to deter widespread human rights
abuses. As Professor Mark Janis has observed, "The central problem
has become not so much finding a universal law of human rights (most
agree that one now exists), but enforcing that law."'
This enforcement problem may explain why human rights advo-
cates have been so intent on having U.S. courts pass judgment on al-
leged human rights abuses occurring in other countries. Given encour-
agement by the seminal Filartiga decision,2 there have been numerous
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I would like to thank
Kathryn Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Hiroshi Motomura, Alisa Schreibman, and Steve
Smith for helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Christine Trend
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1. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (2d ed. 1993); see
also, e.g., BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 233 (1996) (noting the "fundamental weakness of interna-
tional law enforcement mechanisms'); Daniel Bodansky, Human Rights and Universal
Jurisdiction, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1
(Mark Gibney ed., 1991) (noting that "implementation and enforcement of these [human
rights] standards have been woefully inadequate"); Louis Henkin, Human Rights and
State "Sovereignty, " 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 41 (1995/96) ("Enforcement has always
been seen as the weak link in the international legal system, and it is surely the weak
link of international human rights law.").
2. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, the court al-
lowed two Paraguayans to sue a former Paraguayan military official for allegedly violat-
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cases brought in recent years concerning alleged human rights abuses
committed in places such as Bosnia,3 Ethiopia, 4 Guatemala, 5 and the
Philippines.6 These cases typically involve torture, summary execution,
war crimes, or other egregious conduct by foreign government or quasi-
government actors. Although it may be difficult for the plaintiffs in
these cases to collect damage awards, many of them find value in sim-
ply obtaining a formal condemnation of the conduct in question.
7
Lawyers and commentators are now turning their attention inward
to some extent, seeking to apply the international human rights stan-
dards to U.S. government actors.8 Again, they are looking to U.S.
courts. And, for a variety of reasons, the international law they seek to
have the courts apply is customary rather than codified. 9 This custom-
ary law, they argue, has the status in this country of federal common
law.
In a recent article, Professor Jack Goldsmith and I provided a cri-
ing customary international law by engaging in torture and other acts in Paraguay. In
doing so, the court held that customary international law has the status in this country of
federal common law. Id. at 885. As Professor Bederman has observed, "[i]n a sense, all
current human rights litigation owes its fortune to Filartiga." David J. Bederman, Dead
Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation,
25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 255, 256 (1995/96); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991) ("In Filartiga, transnational pub-
lic law litigants finally found their Brown v. Board of Education.").
3. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
4. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
5. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
6. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. See Beth Stephens, Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191, 203 (1995/96).
8. See articles cited infra notes 14-17; see also Paul L. Hoffman, The "Blank Stare
Phenomenon" Proving Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 181, 189 (1995/96) (noting that "the critical crossroads for the [Filartiga] prece-
dents will come when we try to rely upon them to sue U.S. government defendants");
Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and In-
ternational Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1073-74 (1985) ("Subjecting violations of interna-
tional law by foreign governments to federal court review makes it difficult to justify
shielding similar violations by our own government from judicial scrutiny.").
9. There are two principal types of international law-treaties and customary inter-
national law. A treaty is a "purposeful agreement among states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. I, ch. 1, introductory note at
18 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Customary international law is the law of
the international community that "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." Id. § 102(2); see also Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 STAT. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (sources of interna-
tional law include "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law"). Although much of international human rights law is reflected in treaties as well as
in customary international law, the treaties generally cannot be invoked as a source of
law in U.S. courts, either because the United States has declined to ratify the treaties or
because it has declared them to be "non-self-executing." See text accompanying notes 100-
110.
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tique of the proposition that customary international law has the status
of federal common law, a proposition that we called the "modern posi-
tion." 10 The modern position has become widely accepted only in the
last twenty years, and to date it has been invoked primarily in interna-
tional human rights litigation. Among other things, it has been invoked
to support the constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, which pur-
ports to give the federal district courts jurisdiction over "any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States."" Many suits brought under the Alien
Tort Statute are between aliens and concern alleged violations of cus-
tomary international law. Because Article III diversity jurisdiction does
not extend to suits between aliens, 12 it may be that federal courts can
constitutionally hear such cases only if customary international law has
the status of federal law.'
3
The potential consequences of the modern position, however, are
far greater than merely opening the doors of the federal courts to alien-
alien suits under the Alien Tort Statute. If customary international law
has the status of federal common law, it presumably preempts inconsis-
tent state law in this country. 14 Thus, to recite a few examples, it might
be used to invalidate state laws ranging from death penalty provisions,
to state immigration measures like California's Proposition 187, to limi-
tations on the rights of homosexuals.' 5 Perhaps even more dramati-
cally, some proponents of the modern position argue that, because cus-
tomary international law is federal law, the President may be compelled
10. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
12. See 15 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 102.77, 102.78 (3d ed.
1997); 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
JURISDICTION 2D § 3604 (1984 & 1997 Supp.); see also, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800); Saadeh v.
Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
13. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 847-48; see also Anne-Marie Burley,
The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
461, 468 (1989).
14. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295.
15. For commentary suggesting that these state laws are inconsistent with customary
international law, see, for example, Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Do-
mestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52
U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983) (death penalty provisions); Stephen Knight, Note, Proposition
187 and International Human Rights Law: Illegal Discrimination in the Right to Educa-
tion, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183 (1995) (Proposition 187); Brenda Sue-
Thornton, The New International Jurisprudence and the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Col-
lision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REV. 725 (1995) (limitations on rights of homo-
sexuals); see also Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against Federal and
State Governments, 104 HARM. L. REV. 1269 (1991) (arguing that courts should enforce
international law against the federal and state governments).
1998
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by the courts to follow it.16 Some proponents even argue that customary
international law supersedes inconsistent federal legislation, at least if
the customary international law is formed after the enactment of the
legislation.17 Professor Jordan Paust, a fellow panelist at this Collo-
quium, goes so far as to argue that some customary international law
norms have the status of U.S. constitutional law and therefore super-
sede even later-in-time federal legislation.
18
For purposes of this panel discussion on the impact of international
law in the domestic arena, I will elaborate on two points made by Pro-
fessor Goldsmith and myself in our recent article: first, that customary
international law did not have the status of federal law in the nine-
teenth century; and, second, that customary international law's pur-
ported status today as federal common law is at least in tension with
the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 19 In doing
so, I will discuss several examples that tend to clarify and confirm these
claims. In addition, because Professor Paust is a participant on this
panel, I will highlight some areas of disagreement between Professor
Paust and myself. I will not attempt here, however, a point-by-point
rebuttal of Professor Paust's "some nineteen points of disagreement and
concern" with Professor Goldsmith's and my views (recited by Professor
Paust without much explanation in a long footnote),20 although much of
what I say here will be relevant to those points.
21
16. For debate over this issue, see Essays, Agora: May the President Violate Custom-
ary International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986); Essays, Agora: May the President
Violate Customary International Law? (Cont'd), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371 (1987); The Author-
ity of the United States Executive to Interpret, Articulate or Violate the Norms of Interna-
tional Law, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 297 (1986); see also Michael J. Glennon, Raising
The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Un-
constitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321 (1985); Lobel, supra note 8, at 1071; Arthur M.
Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Cen-
tury of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 872 (1987).
18. See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6,
95, 174-75, 186, 193-95, 324-25, 338-45, 371 (1996). Notwithstanding Professor Paust's
arguments, the lower courts uniformly have rejected the proposition that customary in-
ternational law supersedes federal legislation. See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d
916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1986).
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. See Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the International Court of Justice, 26
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 787, 799 n.71 (1998).
21. Nor do I discuss here the use of international law by courts in interpreting federal
enactments. This interpretative use of international law is reflected, for example, in the
"Charming Betsy canon," pursuant to which courts will, "[wihere fairly possible," construe
federal statutes "so as not to conflict with international law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), su-
pra note 9, § 114; see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) ("[Ain act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains. .. .'). For discussion of the history and proper
role of the Charming Betsy canon, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
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II. STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY
A number of courts and commentators have relied on history to
support their claim that customary international law today has the
status of federal common law. The court in Filartiga, for example,
claimed that customary international law "has always been part of the
federal common law."22 Other courts have invoked history in claiming
that it is "well settled" that customary international law has the status
of federal common law.23 Several commentators similarly have claimed
that customary international law had the status in the nineteenth cen-
tury of federal law. 24 In making these claims, courts and commentators
typically cite to statements in early Supreme Court decisions referring
to the law of nations as, for example, "part of the law of the land"25 or
"part of our law."
26
These courts and commentators are impliedly arguing that, be-
cause customary international law had a certain status in the nine-
teenth century, it should have that status today. The proper weight to
be attributed to history in legal analysis is, of course, a matter of sub-
stantial controversy. 27 Moreover, "[h]istory itself cannot justify guid-
ance by history"; rather, the justification "must... come from theory."28
My focus here is not on that theoretical question, however, but rather
on the premise that customary international law had the status in the
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J.
479 (1998). It is also reflected to some extent in the "presumption against extraterritori-
ality," pursuant to which courts are to presume '"that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the
United States.'" EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). For discussion of this presumption, and
its relationship to international law, see Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 510-19, 545-61 (1997).
22. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th
Cir. 1992); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995).
24. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 18, at 5-8; Glennon, supra note 16, at 345-47; Lobel,
supra note 8, at 1090-95.
25. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
26. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
27. This controversy is reflected, for example, in the debates between "originalist"
and "textualist" theories of constitutional interpretation. See Lawrence Lessig, Translat-
ing Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 127-28 (discussing these
debates). In the context of international law, compare PAUST, supra note 18, at 6, 34 (re-
lying on early U.S. history to support claims regarding current domestic legal status of
customary international law), with Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in
Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 849 (1989) (stating that "their contextual dif-
ferences from world affairs should lead us to view the various statements about the law of
nations from that era as having no bearing on modern controversies').
28. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1745
(1996).
1998
DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
nineteenth century of federal law. The historical evidence suggests that
courts and commentators have been taking statements by the Supreme
Court out of context and that customary international law was not in
fact treated in the nineteenth century as federal law.
29
In the nineteenth century, federal courts applied a body of law that
has come to be referred to as "general law" or "general common law."
30
General common law was not viewed as emanating from any one sover-
eign source, but rather from "common practice and consent among a
number of sovereigns." 31 In Justice Holmes' words, general common
law was "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute."32 Thus,
"American courts resorted to this. . . body of preexisting law... with-
out insisting that the law be attached to any particular sovereign."3
3
The important point for present purposes is that general common
law was not viewed as federal law. In particular, it was not considered
part of the "Laws of the United States" within the meaning of Articles
III and VI of the Constitution. Thus, federal court interpretations of
general common law were not binding on the states, and a case arising
under general common law did not establish federal question jurisdic-
tion.
34
Prior to Erie, customary international law (referred to in the nine-
teenth century as part of the "law of nations") 35 had the status of gen-
eral common law. 36 Indeed, the Supreme Court's most famous applica-
29. The following discussion elaborates on Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at
822-26.
30. See generally William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513
(1984).
31. Id. at 1517.
32. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1517.
34. See id. at 1521-27; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1274-75 (1985).
35. "In its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised the law merchant, maritime
law, and the law of conflicts of laws, as well as the law governing the relations between
states." Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 819, 821-22 (1989); see also Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the
National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27 (1952). But see PAUST, supra
note 18, at 33 (distinguishing law of nations from maritime law).
36. My claim is not that the law of nations was always labeled as general common
law, just that it was treated like other bodies of law that have come to be referred to as
general common law-in particular, that it was treated as non-federal law. Consequently,
my claim is not undermined by the existence of decisions, such as those cited by Professor
Paust, in which courts referred separately to the "common law" and the 'law of nations."
See PAUST, supra note 18, at 30-32. It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court
on several occasions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did refer to the law
of nations as part of the "general law," which was the phrase the Court used for general
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tion of general common law, Swift v. Tyson,37 involved the law mer-
chant, which was then a component of the law of nations. 38 Customary
international law, like other general common law, was viewed as ema-
nating not from a particular sovereign source, but rather from princi-
ples of natural law and from international custom. 39 When courts ap-
plied this law, they were not Seen as "legislating," because, among other
things, the law was believed to be objective and discoverable.
40
Importantly, customary international law, like other general com-
mon law, was not considered part of the "supreme Law of the Land" in
Article VI.41 Nor was it considered part of the "Laws of the United
States" for purposes of constitutional or statutory federal question ju-
risdiction. 42 These historical conclusions, although resisted by some
commentators, 43 are supported by several examples.
First, the Supreme Court in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries consistently refused to review lower court rulings concerning
customary international law, on the ground that the cases did not arise
common law. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47. Moreover, as Professor Louis
Henkin has noted, there are "[niumerous statements" from the Supreme Court in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries referring to the law of nations as part of the
"common law." LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
509 n.17 (2d ed. 1996); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 161 (1820)
(referring to "the law of nations, (which is part of the common law)"); United States v.
Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 392 (1798) (referring to "the law of nations, which is a part
of the common law of the United States'); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161
(1795) (referring to "the common law, of which the law of nations is a part") (Iredell, J.,
concurring). This is also how the law of nations was characterized in England. See 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 67 (1769) (noting that
the law of nations is "adopted in it's [sic] full extent by the common law, and is held to be
a part of the law of the land."); Heathfield v. Chilton, 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 51 (K.B. 1767)
(same).
37. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
38. See Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1540-54; Jay, supra note 35, at 821-22.
39. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-
1835 676-78 (1988); Jay, supra note 35, at 822-23.
40. See Jay, supra note 35, at 824, 833; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1056-57 (1985); cf. RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH
U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM 32 (1977) (describing this view with respect
to all of general common law); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1365, 1405-07 (1997) (same).
41. See, e.g., CHARLES PERGLER, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1928) (if state statute "violates an established principle of in-
ternational law ... clearly there would be only one course open to the courts, viz., to en-
force the state statute, always assuming its constitutionality and that it does not contra-
vene any valid federal enactment, or any treaty); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 161 (1922) ("state constitution or legislative provision in
violation of customary international law [wa]s valid unless in conflict with a Federal con-
stitutional provision or an act of Congress").
42. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 824.
43. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 18, at n.71.
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under federal law. In an 1875 decision, for example, the Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review issues concerning "the general laws
of war, as recognized by the law of nations" because such issues did not
involve "the constitution, laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of
the United States" but rather concerned only "principles of general law
alone."4 4 The Court reached this conclusion over Justice Bradley's lone
dissent, in which he specifically argued that a claim under "unwritten
international law" is made under the "laws of the United States."
45
Similarly, in an 1886 decision, the Court held that the question whether
forcible seizure of a criminal defendant in a foreign country is grounds
to resist trial in state court is "a question of common law, or of the law
of nations" that the Court has "no right to review."46 And, in a 1924 de-
cision, the Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review an issue
concerning foreign sovereign immunity-an issue governed by customary
international law-because that issue was one of "general law" over
which the Court had no jurisdiction.
47
Second, in several decisions in the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court indicated (admittedly in dicta) that customary international law
is not to be applied if it is inconsistent with federal legislation or a con-
trolling executive act. In the famous Paquete Habana decision in 1900,
for example, the Court stated that U.S. courts are to apply customary
international law "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision." 4 In an earlier decision, the Court
said that it was bound by the law of nations "[t]ill ... an act [of Con-
gress] be passed."49 In still another decision, 50 the Court emphasized
that the international law it was applying did not conflict with Presi-
dential action 5' and described the law of nations as "a guide which the
sovereign follows or abandons at his will."52 The lower courts have in-
44. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 286, 286-87 (1875).
45. Id. at 288 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
46. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
47. Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924); see also
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 266 U.S. 580 (1924) (dismissing
appeal raising issue of foreign sovereign immunity "for the want of jurisdiction'), per cu-
riam dismissing a writ of error for want of jurisdiction, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
For additional cases, see Weisburd, supra note 16, at 1218-19.
48. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also id. at 708 (courts must
"give effect to" customary international law "in the absence of any treaty or other public
act of the government in relation to the matter').
49. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
50. See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
51. Id. at 121-23.
52. Id. at 128. For differing views regarding the significance of this decision, compare
Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government
to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 922 n.27 (1986) (describ-
ing Brown as "the clearest case in which the President's wide discretion in this area is
acknowledged'), with Jordan J. Paust, The President is Bound by International Law, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 380 (1987) (stating that "the various opinions of the Justices in Brown
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terpreted these decisions to stand for the proposition that Congress and
the President have the power to violate customary international law.5 3
Finally, in a number of instances in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, the federal government made statements to foreign gov-
ernments that the violation of customary international law by a state
did not by itself create an issue of federal law. In the early nineteenth
century, there were instances of state prosecution of foreign citizens in
alleged violation of immunities under the law of nations. In these in-
stances, the federal government disclaimed the power to interfere with
or review the state court proceedings absent federal legislation on the
subject.54 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there
were instances in which the states failed to prosecute perpetrators of
mob violence against aliens, in alleged violation of obligations under
customary international law. Again, the federal government main-
tained that it lacked the authority to compel state compliance with cus-
tomary international law in the absence of a treaty or federal statute on
the subject.
55
Because of these and other examples, a number of commentators
have concluded, like Professor Goldsmith and myself, that customary
international law had the status in the nineteenth century of general
common law, not federal law. Thus, for example, Professor Stewart Jay
has stated that "[tlhe law of nations was classified as 'general law' in
the sense that Swift t. Tyson later employed the term."5 6 Similarly, the
and the holding actually affirm that the President is bound by international law"); see
also PAUST, supra note 18, at 144-45 (discussing Brown).
53. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1995); Gis-
bert v. U.S. Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1447-48 (5th Cir. 1993); Committee of
United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See
also the cases cited supra note 17.
54. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 825; see also WRIGHT, supra note 41,
at 20-24 (1922) (discussing examples); David J. Bederman, The Cautionary Tale of Alex-
ander McLeod: Superior Orders and the American Writ of Habeas Corpus, 41 EMORY L. J.
515 (1992) (same). An early example of this view is an opinion by Attorney General Levi
Lincoln, in which he stated that no federal law was violated by an assault on a Spanish
ambassador in violation of the law of nations because the law of nations is "part of the
municipal law of each state." Insult to the Spanish Minister, 5 Op. Att'y. Gen. 691, 692
(1802).
55. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 825; see also CHARLES CHENEY HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES §
290, at 518 (1922) (noting that the federal government was "obliged to content itself with
requesting the Governor of such State to set in motion the local machinery of justice");
Charles H. Watson, Need of Federal Legislation in Respect to Mob Violence in Cases of
Lynching of Aliens, Lecture Delivered at the School of Civics and Philanthropy, Chicago,
Ill. (Mar. 13, 1916), in 25 YALE L.J. 561, 570 (1916) ('"[Ihe federal officers and courts
have no power in such cases to intervene for either the protection of a foreign citizen or for
the punishment of his slayers."') (quoting PRESIDENT HARRISON, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES 686 (1891)).
56. Jay, supra note 27, at 832.
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Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
which is otherwise supportive of broad claims regarding the status of
customary international law, observes that, "[diuring the reign of Swift
v. Tyson... State and federal courts respectively determined interna-
tional law for themselves as they did common law, and questions of in-
ternational law could be determined differently by the courts of various
States and by the federal courts."57 Even Professor Louis Henkin, per-
haps the leading proponent of the modern position, appears to have
conceded, at least in some writings, that customary international law
was not treated as federal law in the nineteenth century. 58 It is telling
that the commentators who disagree with this conclusion are unable to
cite a single decision from the nineteenth century in which a court in-
validated a presidential, congressional, or state enactment on the basis
of a conflict with customary international law.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ERIE FOR THE STATUS OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
That customary international law did not have the status of federal
common law in the nineteenth century does not mean, of course, that it
should not have this status today. It is possible that other, non-
historical arguments might support the treatment of customary inter-
national law today as federal common law. This is not the place for a
comprehensive response to such arguments, some of which are ad-
dressed in the article by Professor Goldsmith and myself. It is suffi-
cient for present purposes to note that, to be successful, such arguments
must overcome a number of constitutional concerns, including the coun-
termajoritarian concern of unelected judges applying law derived from
sources largely external to the domestic political process, the separa-
tion-of-powers concern associated with judges interpreting and enforc-
ing such law without authorization to do so from the political branches,
and the federalism concern of federal judges making supreme federal
law in this area binding on the states.59
My focus here is not on these constitutional issues per se, but
rather on a single event that, by itself, substantially undermines the
modern position claim that customary international law has the status
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, ch. 2, introductory note, at 41.
58. See Henkin, supra note 17, at 886 n.69; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law
in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557-58 (1984); but see Louis HENKIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 69 (1995) (asserting, without citational sup-
port, that customary international law has historically been supreme federal law).
59. For discussion of these concerns, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 857-
59, 861-70; John M. Rogers, International Human Rights Law and U.S. Law, in WORLD
JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 107, 116-18 (Mark Gibney ed.,
1991); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 665, 707-31 (1986).
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of federal common law. That event is the Supreme Court's decision in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.60 The Erie decision, while long the subject
of substantial attention by federal courts and civil procedure scholars,
has generally been ignored by proponents of the view that customary
international law has the status of federal common law. This is sur-
prising, given that Erie appears to have direct relevance to that view on
a number of levels.
61
As discussed above, the federal courts in the nineteenth century
felt free to develop their own general common law, independent of the
common law developed by state courts. In overruling the nearly cen-
tury old Swift v. Tyson decision that had approved this practice, the
Court declared that "[t]here is no federal general common law."62 As a
result, the Court held, consistent with its reading of the Rules of Deci-
sion Act,63 that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitu-
tion or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the State."
64
As we have seen, customary international law had the status in the
nineteenth century of general common law. 65 Erie's holding therefore
could be read as directly precluding independent application of custom-
ary international law by the federal courts. Indeed, no less a judge than
Learned Hand reached this very conclusion.66
One obvious response to this argument, made by Professor Philip
Jessup shortly after Erie was decided, is that, notwithstanding its broad
language, the Court in Erie was "surely was not thinking of interna-
tional law."67 While this is probably true, it is not by itself a particu-
larly persuasive response. The Court in Erie was not thinking specifi-
cally about many areas of law that are presumably subject to its
holding. More fundamentally, the Court was thinking about-and
speaking to-the proper role of the federal courts in making law. That
60. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
61. The following discussion elaborates on Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at
852-55.
62. 304 U.S. at 78.
63. The Rules of Decision Act was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789 and today appears at 28 U.S.C. § 1652. The Act provides: "The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
64. 304 U.S. at 78. The Court forgot about treaties, which are also mentioned in the
Rules of Decision Act (as well as in the Supremacy Clause).
65. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
66. See Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948). Judge Hand did add
the following caveat: "Whether an avowed refusal [by a state] to accept a well-established
doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, would present a federal
question we need not consider, for neither is present here." Id.
67. Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to Interna-
tional Law, 33 AM. J. IN'L L. 740, 743 (1939).
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aspect of its analysis does not seem to depend on the particular law in
question.
In any event, even if the actual holding of Erie does not speak to
the issue, the reasoning of Erie provides additional grounds for ques-
tioning the claim that federal courts today have the independent power
to apply customary international law. As Justice Frankfurter later ex-
plained, Erie "did not merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a
particular way of looking at law."68 Specifically, the Court in Erie re-
jected two theoretical underpinnings of nineteenth-century jurispru-
dence: the idea that federal courts can apply law not derived from a
sovereign source, and the idea that courts merely discover the common
law rather than make it.
In rejecting the first idea, the Court explained that the practice of
the federal courts in developing their own general common law had
rested on a "fallacy."69 This fallacy involved the assumption, in the
words of Justice Holmes, that "there is 'a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until
changed by statute."' 70 In fact, said the Court (again quoting Holmes),
'law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist with-
out some definite authority behind it."'71
In rejecting the second idea, the Court expressed the view that
courts do not discover common law, they make it. The Court quoted
Justice Field's observation, for example, that federal general common
law 'is often little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine
thinks at the time should be the general law on a particular subject."'
7 2
The Court therefore emphasized the need to identify the source of the
authority being exercised by the federal courts, noting, for example,
that "no clause in the Constitution purports to confer [general common-
lawmaking] power upon the federal courts."
73
These two ideas rejected in Erie had served to legitimize judicial
68. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945); see also, e.g., BRIDWELL &
WHITTEN, supra note 40, at 130 ("Erie purported to overrule a particular philosophy of, or
manner of looking at, law'); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3.5, at 300
(2d ed. 1994) ("the decision reflected a major shift in jurisprudence away from a belief
that courts simply apply preexisting objectively true natural law principles'); Larry
Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 283 (1992)
("Erie's real significance is that it represents the Supreme Court's formal declaration that
this [nineteenth-century] view of the common law (with all its implications for our under-
standing of law in general) is dead....').
69. 304 U.S. at 79.
70. Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518,
533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
71, Id.
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application of customary international law in the nineteenth century. 74
With these ideas repudiated, the claim that federal courts can continue
to apply customary international law independent of incorporation by
the political branches becomes at least questionable. This is especially
so given the fundamental difference between pre-Erie general common
law and post-Erie federal common law-the latter is considered supreme
federal law binding on the states. As Professor Weisburd has ex-
plained, "extending federal common law status to customary interna-
tional law would federalize a subject over which the Supreme Court
consistently disclaimed control even pre-Erie."
75
Of course, notwithstanding Erie, the federal courts have continued
to create some common law. This post-Erie "federal common law," un-
like the earlier general common law, is considered part of supreme fed-
eral law and thus is binding on the states.7 6 Although scholars differ
significantly regarding the proper scope of federal common law, 77 many
agree that, in light of Erie, there must be some sort of authorization
from the Constitution or federal legislation for the federal courts to en-
gage in this lawmaking.
78
So, we are left with the following question: Where is the authoriza-
tion for the federal courts to apply customary international law as fed-
eral common law? 79 The authorization cannot easily be found in the
text of the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution declares treaties
to be the supreme law of the land,8 0 and Article III extends the federal
74. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
75. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 41 (1995).
76. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-07 (1964). Judge Friendly famously referred to this common
law as the "new federal common law." In fact, the common law before Erie was not, at
least generally, federal. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The confusion arises
because "federal" can refer to the nature of the law (supreme federal law) or the source of
the law (federal courts).
77. For a discussion of various theories regarding federal common law, see George D.
Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudi-
cation-A (New) Erie Problem, 12 PACE L. REV. 229 (1992).
78. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 895-96 (1986); Friendly, supra note 75, at 407, 421, 522; Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1985);
see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 876 n.263 (citing additional authority).
79. In a recent article, Professor Lawrence Lessig misstates the authorization re-
quirement proposed by Professor Goldsmith and myself as requiring that, "before interna-
tional law gets incorporated into a domestic regime, a statute must ratify it." Lawrence
Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1785, 1810 (1997). In fact, all that our thesis requires is "political branch
authorization," something that, as we explained, could take a variety of forms and may
not always be easy to ascertain. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 819-20, 869,
870, 871.
80. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
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judicial power to cases arising under treaties,8 1 but neither article men-
tions customary international law.8 2 The only reference in the Consti-
tution to customary international law is its delegation of power to Con-
gress to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.8 3 As for
statutory authorization, Congress has not enacted any statute pur-
porting to authorize general incorporation of customary international
law into federal law. It has instead incorporated customary interna-
tional law into federal law in select instances,8 4 something that would
be largely superfluous if all of customary international law were federal
common law.
Professor Paust maintains that the authorization comes from the
reference in Articles III and VI of the Constitution to the "Laws of the
United States," which he maintains encompasses customary interna-
tional law.85 There are a number of difficulties with this argument.
First, it does not sit well with the historical evidence, which, as dis-
cussed above, suggests that customary international law was treated
like general common law, not federal law.8 6 Indeed, Professor Paust's
argument appears to be the same one made in 1875 by Justice Bradley
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ....').
81. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ('The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; .. . .
82. The historical record of the drafting of the Constitution "is at best inconclusive"
regarding the Framers' intent concerning the domestic legal status of customary interna-
tional law. Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 493 n.38 (1989). An early draft of Article III, ap-
parently written by James Wilson, would have extended federal court jurisdiction to cases
arising under the "Law of Nations." See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 157 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). The reference was deleted, however, without expla-
nation. See PAUST, supra note 18, at 30 n. 33; Henkin, International Law as Law in the
United States, supra note 58, at 1569 n.22; Jay, supra note 34, at 830.
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("he Congress shall have Power... To define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations;"). For a discussion of the history of this clause, see Charles D. Siegal,
Deference and its Dangers: Congress' Power to Define... Offenses Against the Law of Na-
tions, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 874-79 (1988).
84. A recent example is the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, in which Congress
created a federal cause of action against any individual, acting "under actual or apparent
authority, or under color of law, of any foreign nation," who subjects another individual to
torture or extrajudicial killing. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 STAT. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350).
85. See Paust, supra note 18 at 6; see also Comment, Federal Common Law and Arti-
cle III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325, 328 (1964) (making similar
argument).
86. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text; see also Jay, supra note 34, at 832-
33 (explaining that the law of nations probably was not mentioned in Articles III and VI
of the Constitution because it was considered general law, not federal law); Weisburd, su-
pra note 16, at 1233 (explaining that, "at least throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, customary international law was not seen as part of the law of the United
States, as that term is used in article III of the Constitution.')
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and rejected by all the other members of the Supreme Court.87 Moreo-
ver, the argument ignores other language in the Constitution, such as
the requirement in Article VI that "Laws of the United States" be "made
in pursuance" of the Constitution.88 In light of that requirement, Arti-
cle VI cannot easily be read to include customary international law,
given that, as Professor Henkin notes, customary international law "is
not made by the United States and through its governmental institu-
tions alone but by them together with many foreign governments in a
process to which the United States contributes only in an uncertain way
and to an indeterminate degree."8 9  In addition, reading it that way
would contradict "the [Framers'] prepositivist understanding that
judges merely discovered law."90  Finally, the argument does not ex-
plain why the Framers would mention the law of nations specifically in
Article I but refer to it only by implication in other articles, or why they
would repeatedly mention treaties but not the law of nations. 91
I do not contend that this is the last word on the subject of authori-
zation. Complicated arguments about authorization have been and will
continue to be developed. Professor Goldsmith and I address some of
these arguments in our article, including the argument that the
authorization comes from the structure of the Constitution.92 Signifi-
cant progress will have been made, in my view, simply if more propo-
nents of the modern position begin to identify and explain the purported
authorization.
The authorization issue is particularly important today, given re-
cent changes in the nature of customary international law. As Profes-
87. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
88. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; .... ")
89. HENKIN, supra note 36, at 508 n.16; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10,
at 850.
90. Jay, supra note 34, at 833.
91. There were statements in connection with neutrality prosecutions in the 1790s
asserting that the law of nations was part of "the laws of the United States." See, e.g.,
Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100-01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Grand Jury
charge of Jay, C. J.). The meaning of these statements is unclear at best. There is noth-
ing to suggest that these statements meant that the law of nations was part of the "Laws
of the United States" within the meaning of Articles III and VI of the Constitution. In-
deed, the historical evidence suggests that these statements might have meant simply
that the law of nations was general common law, see Jay, supra note 27, at 825-33, or
that it was state law, see Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 L. &
HIST. REv. 267 (1986). In any event, the Supreme Court subsequently resolved the mat-
ter against the law of nations having federal-law status. First, the Court repudiated fed-
eral court common law prosecutions such as those conducted in the neutrality cases. See
United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). Second, as the nineteenth century progressed, the
Court repeatedly referred to and treated the law of nations as general common law.
92. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 860-70.
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sor Brilmayer has observed, "notions of what international law is all
about are central to arguments about whether it belongs in American
courts."9 3 In this regard, much of the traditional customary interna-
tional law of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has either
been codified in this country in the form of statutory or treaty law (as is
the case, for example, with respect to foreign sovereign and diplomatic
immunity)94 or has become irrelevant (as is the case, for example, with
respect to prize law).95 Consequently, most of the relevance of the mod-
ern position claim that customary international law has the status of
federal common law concerns what Professor Goldsmith and I have
termed the "new customary international law."96 This new customary
international law has evolved largely since World War II, and largely in
the area of human rights.
As Professor Goldsmith and I, as well as others, have explained,
the new customary international law differs from traditional customary
international law in several fundamental ways: it can arise much more
quickly; it is based less on actual state practice and more on interna-
tional pronouncements, such as UN General Assembly resolutions and
multilateral treaties; and, perhaps most importantly, it purports to
regulate not the relations of states among themselves, but rather a
state's treatment of its own citizens.97 In sum, the new customary in-
ternational law is less consensual and less objective than traditional
customary international law, and it is more likely to conflict with do-
mestic law.
Although these changes in the nature of customary international
law certainly could be questioned (both normatively and descrip-
tively),98 I do not take issue with them for purposes of this paper. My
93. Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
YALE L.J. 2277, 2279 (1991).
94. Foreign sovereign immunity is now the subject of a comprehensive federal stat-
ute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1994), and diplo-
matic immunity is the subject of treaties to which the United States is a party. See, e.g.,
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S.
95.
95. Prize law, an important feature of the Supreme Court's nineteenth-century
docket, has now largely disappeared. See David J. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of
Prize, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 31, 36-41 (1995) (book review).
96. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 838-42.
97. Id.; see also HENKIN, supra note 58, at 33-39, 173-81 (describing these changes);
Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 53, 64-74 (1981) (same); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 529, 543-50 (1993) (same).
98. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Cus-
tom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992); J.S. Watson,
Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in Inter-
national Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609 (1979). But see Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature,
Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147
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argument is simply that these developments further compel considera-
tion of the proper domestic institutions for giving effect to this law. In
particular, they arguably increase the need for the law to go through
U.S. democratic processes before having the effect in this country of
federal law.99
This need is further heightened by actions taken by the political
branches in recent years with respect to international human rights
law. For better or worse, the political branches have gone out of their
way not to convert international human rights law into domestic law.
Much of the customary international law of human rights is reflected in
multilateral treaties. 100 The first thing that is noteworthy about these
treaties is that the United States has so far declined to ratify many of
them. 10 1 In addition, for the treaties that it has ratified, the United
States has consistently attached a series of reservations, understand-
ings, and declarations ("RUDs") that purport to limit the treaties' do-
mestic effect.
As an example, the United States attached to its ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights10 2 "the corner-
stone of modern international human rights law"10 3 five reservations,
five understandings, and four declarations. 104 These provisions include
retention of certain substantive rights that are in conflict with provi-
(1995/96) (defending modern customary international law as consistent with traditional
principles).
99. As Professor John Rogers has pointed out: "To say that the courts have an addi-
tional body of 'higher law' to apply, to be found in the whole amorphous body of customary
international law, is to inject an enormously distorting overdose of additional power into
the judicial branch. This is particularly so in the area of human rights, where practice is
difficult to ascertain, and evidence that nations feel bound by international human rights
norms is difficult to distinguish from hypocrisy." Rogers, supra note 59, at 117.
100. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 832, 839-40; Henkin, supra note 10,
at 36; Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982).
101. The United States has not yet ratified, for example, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200(A) (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976); the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 46), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 29, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, adopted Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force
July 18, 1978).
102. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
103. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 277
(1995).
104. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2,
1992).
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sions of the Covenant, such as the right to execute juveniles. They also
include a federalism clause, stating that, in implementing the treaty,
matters within the jurisdiction of the constituent states may be imple-
mented by the states rather than by the federal government. In addi-
tion, they include a declaration that the treaty is not self-executing.
Similar provisions appear in connection with the U.S. ratification of
other human rights treaties.10 5
One motivation for these RUDs, which the government included in
the face of substantial domestic and foreign opposition, "was a desire
not to effectuate changes in domestic law." 106 Thus, again taking the
example of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
non-self-executing declaration "clarif[ies] that the Covenant will not
create a private cause of action in U.S. courts";10 7 the federalism under-
standing "serves to emphasize domestically that there is no intent to al-
ter the constitutional balance of authority between State and Federal
governments or to use the provisions of the Covenant to 'federalize'
matters now within the competence of the States";108 and specific reser-
vations that preserve differences between United States law and the
requirements of the Covenant ensure that "changes in U.S. law in these
areas will occur through the normal legislative process."' 09 This posi-
tion of the political branches of our government further brings into
question the independent incorporation of such norms into domestic law
by the federal judiciary. 11
105. See U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REC. S7634-02
(daily ed., June 24, 1994); U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990); U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and
Understandings, International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 132 CONG. REC. S1355-01 (daily ed., Feb. 19, 1986).
106. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1206 (1993).
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations Report, Sen. Rep. 102-23, 102nd Cong. 2d Sess., at 19 (March 24, 1992).
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Some commentators suggest that the exercise of this independent judicial power
should not be a matter of concern because Congress can always overrule the courts if it
disagrees with their decisions in this area. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 58, at 1566.
There are a number of problems with this reasoning. First, not all proponents of the
modern position agree that Congress can in fact overrule customary international law.
See Henkin, supra note 17; Henkin, supra note 58. Second, the argument proves too
much. The argument could be made, for example, regarding all of the Swiftian general
common law, yet Erie declared that the federal courts do not have the power to make such
law. See 304 U.S. at 78. Third, the argument assumes that Congress has the informa-
tion, time, and political ability to overrule what it would view as judicial mistakes in this
area. In fact, these institutional limitations may mean that "lawmaking by federal courts
would in most cases give the last word to the federal courts rather than to Congress."
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, and for other reasons articulated
in my article with Professor Goldsmith, customary international law
should not have the status today of federal common law. Acceptance of
this conclusion does not mean that customary international law would
necessarily have the status of state law. Absent some sort of legislative
enactment, it may not be law at all for U.S. courts, in either the state or
the federal courts. If states did choose to borrow international law
principles into their law, they presumably could do so, and this bor-
rowed international law would have the same effect as other state law.
At first glance, this conclusion-that states might have a role in inter-
preting customary international law-may seem surprising. But it
should not be. This was true historically, as discussed above. Moreo-
ver, in the area of human rights law, incorporation of international
norms by the states generally would make the states more rights-
protecting than the federal government, a status that is often allowed to
the states in other areas of law.111
Despite my disagreement with the modern position, I want to em-
phasize that I am not, to use Professor Paust's term, an "enemy of cus-
tomary international law."1 1 2 My concern here is not with the legiti-
macy of customary international law but rather with the proper
institutions in our constitutional structure for incorporating such law
into U.S. law.1" 3 As a result, my analysis is not intended as an argu-
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23
(1985). Fourth, the argument begs the question of why the normal constitutional pre-
sumption that state law governs in the face of political branch silence should not apply.
Cf. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994)
(rejecting challenge under dormant foreign commerce clause to state taxation rule and
noting that "we leave it to Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's-to evalu-
ate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy").
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if the exercise of this judicial power is improper,
then it should not be allowed to occur in the first place. See Merrill, supra at 22.
111. See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 70 (2d ed. 1992) ("state courts are always free
to grant individuals more rights than those guaranteed in the Constitution, provided it
[sic] does so on the basis of state law"); id. at 71 ("one must always remember that the
state courts may exceed the federal courts in the granting of rights under the state's laws
or constitution as long as they do not violate a restriction of federal law")
112. Paust, supra note 20.
113. For a powerful criticism of the tendency of some courts and commentators to focus on
rights to the exclusion of structural and institutional considerations, see ROBERT F. NAGEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 62-72
(1989). This tendency may explain Professor Lessig's recent suggestion that the decision
whether to require U.S. courts to obtain authorization from the Constitution or the political
branches before applying international law as federal law involves a choice "between a par-
ticular philosophy of law and a value of justice." Lessig, supra note 79, at 1810. The sharp
dichotomy drawn by Professor Lessig ignores the possibility that institutional considerations
may themselves have implications for justice. His statement may also reflect an assumption
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ment, for example, against ratification of human rights treaties or the
enactment of expansive human rights legislation. Indeed, it could be
read as inviting exactly such measures. In my view, incorporating in-
ternational law in this fashion, rather than on an ad hoc and inconsis-
tent basis through the judiciary, will actually be better in the long run
for the domestic enforceability of international norms.
that courts are the principal agents for justice, a proposition that is both uncertain and con-
troversial. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991) (questioning the
ability of courts to bring about social change).
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